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Abstract
Untreated wastewater being directly discharged into rivers is a very harmful environ-
mental hazard that needs to be tackled urgently in many countries. In order to safeguard
the river ecosystem and reduce water pollution, it is important to have an e­ uent charge
policy that promotes the investment of wastewater treatment technology by domestic rms.
This paper considers the strategic interaction between the government and the domestic
rms regarding the investment in the wastewater treatment technology and the design of
optimal e­ uent charge policy that should be implemented. In this model, the higher is the
proportion of non-investing rms, the higher would be the probability of having to incur an
e­ uent charge and the higher would be that charge. On one hand the government needs to
impose a su¢ ciently strict policy to ensure that rms have strong incentive to invest. On
the other hand, it cannot be too strict that it drives out rms which cannot a¤ord to invest
in such expensive technology. The paper analyses the factors that a¤ect the probability
of investment in this technology. It also explains the di¢ culty of imposing a strict envi-
ronment policy in countries that have too many small rms which cannot a¤ord to invest,
unless subsidised.
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1 Introduction
Rivers and lakes have, for so long, served the needs of communities, as well as agricultural,
aquaculture and industrial sectors in both developed and developing countries. Yet, the densely
populated communities and di¤erent types of businesses, which have scattered along the rivers,
are major point pollution sources. Massive amount of wastewater have been discharged directly
into the rivers. The question that arises is as follows: provided that several countries have
increasingly embraced environmental laws and regulations  though to varying extent why
do they continue to experience relatively poor environmental performance, especially when it
comes to water quality?
With the presence of current environmental regulations, factories and industrial parks in
di¤erent countries are required by law to meet the industrial e­ uent standard by treating
wastewater. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the industrial e­ uent standards in a
number of developing countries mostly specify the allowable concentration of contaminants
contained in the sewage or wastewater. By failing to take into account the total amount of
contaminant loading in the river ecosystem, this gives rise to a possibility that the total amount
of contaminants released through discharged sewage exceeds the carrying capacity of the river
ecosystem.
Given that the deterioration in the water quality poses a serious problem for the economy,
what steps should be taken by the government to address the problem? Typically, there are two
principle approaches to address the negative external e¤ects, in which water pollution is one
of them: Pigouvian taxes and introduction of property rights (Chichilnisky and Heal, 1995).
Applying this idea to look at this issue, there are two approaches to address the problem of
water pollution. First, the government can levy the e­ uent charge on the rms that discharge
wastewater containing contaminants which exceed the announced e­ uent standard (Klayklung
et al., 2010). This type of policy has been used in countries like Thailand, though there has
been a proposal to introduce environmental taxes in Thailand, which aim at dealing with wa-
ter and air pollution. The common approach used in the United States is inspired by Coases
insights, i.e. given that the problem of negative externality arise from an absence of property
rights; hence, establishment of property rights through permits and quotas is necessary. The
key point underlying this approach is as follows: before rms are allowed to discharge waste-
water containing contaminants into the river, they must own the right to do so and such water
discharge rights are conveyed by the purchase of tradable quotas (Chichilnisky and Heal, 1995).
These two approaches to correct and control for pollution are indeed formally equivalent in
some important ways, though not in all ways. A tradable quota system requires polluting rms
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to purchase a permit or right before discharging e­ uent. Since this raises the private cost of
pollution, in this respect, it appears to the polluter like a tax on pollution.
One strand of related literature studies the relationship between rmsincentive in under-
taking R&D, which will lead to the development of new environmental-friendly products and
processes and the environmental policy of the government. Ulph (1997) provides an extensive
survey of literature in this direction. Katsoulacos et al. (1999) nd that tougher environmental
policy does not necessarily increase R&D undertaken by rms due to two conicting e¤ects
caused by a tougher environmental policy: a direct e¤ect of encouraging more environmental
R&D by rms and an indirect e¤ect of raising rmscosts of production, causing rms to reduce
their incentive to undertake R&D. In Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (1997), they examine the
design of technology policy to inuence the investment in R&D by rms in the situation whereby
the government is constrained in the exercise of environmental policy. Though not considering
the issue of investment in R&D, the paper by Klayklung et al. (2010) determine the appropriate
e­ uent tax scheme, which is designed to help prohibit the amount of pollution discharges from
exceeding the carrying capacity of the river ecosystem. In this paper, we combine these two
strands of literature by studying the design of e­ uent charge, which, on one hand, aims to
encourage investment in new technology by domestic rms, and on the other hand, ensures that
the water pollution does not exceed the limit.
We argue that, despite the presence of environmental regulation and industrial e­ uent
standards, it is the responsibility of the government to design policy on e­ uent charge that
provide incentive to the domestic rms to invest in the wastewater treatment technology which
helps reduce the amount of contaminants contained in the e­ uent that is released into the river
ecosystem. We consider an economy which comprises of both small and large rms. We study
the strategic interaction between the government and the domestic rms with regards to the
investment in the wastewater treatment technology and study the design of optimal e­ uent
charge policy to be implemented by the government.
In the framework adopted in this paper, the governments objective is to design the e­ uent
charge policy which gives domestic rms incentive to invest in the wastewater treatment tech-
nology, while ensuring that the aggregate amount of water pollution loading does not exceed
the limit, a level above which there would be an irreversible damage on the river ecosystem. If
the amount of aggregate pollution exceeds such limit, the government would determine which
rms would be charged and how much e­ uent charge they face. In this model, we assume that,
if a rm invests in the wastewater treatment technology, it will not face any e­ uent charge
even though the total level of pollution exceeds the limit. The purpose of this assumption is to
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encourage the domestic rms to invest in the abatement technology. The rms which do not
invest in the technology would have to share the costs from e­ uent charge if the total amount
of pollution exceeds the limit.
We analyse this problem in the context of a coordination game between the domestic rms
in the model with asymmetric information, in which each rm receives a signal about the cost
it will incur if the total level of pollution exceeds the allowable limit. At the time the rm
has to choose whether or not to invest in the wastewater treatment technology, the cost that
will be charged is unknown; it is a function of the number of rms which do not invest in the
abatement technology. The higher is the proportion of non-investing rms, the higher would be
the probability of having to incur the e­ uent charge and the higher would be the cost of not
investing. Thus, so long as a su¢ cient number of rms cooperate by investing in the wastewater
treatment technology, all rms can get away with no additional cost levied on them.
By using the Global Games framework, we then work out the equilibrium threshold: large
rms will choose not to invest in the wastewater treatment technology if they received a signal
below this threshold, and will invest in the technology if they received a signal above this
threshold. Our results show that the probability of investment in the wastewater treatment
technology by the large rms increases with the proportion of small rms and the amount
of pollution discharged by rms, while the probability of investment decreases with the cost of
investment, the e¢ ciency of the technology and the level of water pollution that the government
will allow. Our analysis also points out that the more e¢ cient is the wastewater treatment
technology in reducing pollution, the higher should be the e­ uent charge. Moreover, if the cost
of excess pollution can be transferred to the large rms, the higher would be the probability
that the large rms would invest in the wastewater treatment technology.
Last but not least, in this paper, we explain that in the situation whereby the proportion of
large rms is high, the government can be stricter and ensure that large rms would invest in
the wastewater treatment technology. However, when there are many small rms whose survival
is important for the economy, it would be di¢ cult to expect a very strict environmental policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, outlining
the key assumptions and deriving the equilibrium threshold. Section 3 is devoted to discuss the
results from the comparative statics analysis, discussing di¤erent factors that could a¤ect the





The model has two periods, t1 and t2. This paper is devoted to study the strategic interaction
between the government agency, which is concerned about the water quality, and domestic rms,
which are uniformly distributed on a continuum of mass one. There are two types of domestic
rms: small and large, where j 2 fS;Lg denotes the rms type. The proportion of small and
large rms is  and (1  ), respectively.
The production of output, yj , results in emission of pollution, ej , contained in the e­ uent as
the by-product. To control the aggregate amount of contaminant contained in the wastewater so
that it does not exceed the carrying capacity of the river ecosystem, the government agency can
impose a maximum limit on the aggregate amount of e­ uent at t2, given by P > 0 (the amount
of allowable pollution contained in the e­ uent without causing unacceptable deterioration in
the river ecosystem). The domestic rm can choose to control the amount of contaminant
contained in the wastewater discharged from its point source by investing in the wastewater
treatment system, a type of abatement technology. The domestic rms investment decision
takes place at the beginning of t1. By investing in the wastewater treatment technology, rm
js discharge of pollution is reduced to ej , where 0 <  < 1 and  is referred to as the residual
pollution. The cost of investment in wastewater treatment technology is given by I.
Let S and L denote the prot for the small and large rms, respectively. We assume that
S < L and S < I; thus, there would be no investment in wastewater treatment technology
by the small rms since they cannot a¤ord such expensive investment. It follows that aggregate
amount of pollution contained in the e­ uent discharged by the small rms is always eS .
To encourage the investment in wastewater treatment technology by domestic rms and
ensure that the aggregate amount of pollution discharged into the river does not exceed the
limit, the government can apply the e­ uent charge scheme (Thompson, 1998; Glachant, 2002;
Klayklung et al., 2010). Let  2 [ ;  ] denote the level of per unit charge for e­ uent in excess
of the maximum limit imposed by the government, P . We suppose that domestic rms receive
a noisy signal on  . Based on the observed signal, each domestic rm has to decide whether or
not to invest in the wastewater treatment technology. The higher is the value of  , the tougher
would the rm perceive the penalty would be and the more risky would be its decision not to
invest in the abatement technology.
At t2, if the aggregate amount of pollution loading of e­ uent is below the limit P set
by the government, the payo¤s for the rm which invested in the abatement technology and
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and j , respectively.
However, if the aggregate amount of discharged pollution exceeds P , the government imposes
the e­ uent charge on the rms that did not invest in the wastewater treatment technology.
The government agency is assumed to have information on the amount of pollution contained
in the waste e­ uent discharged from each contributing point sources (after taking into account
the seasonal variation in water quality) by, for examples, monitoring the Biochemical Oxygen
Demand (BOD) values and dissolved oxygen, as well as the knowledge on the presence of
wastewater treatment technology in the rm1. We suppose that large rms who invested in the
wastewater treatment technology are exempted from this e­ uent charge, despite the presence
of residual pollution, ej .
Calculation of e­ uent charge
The liability from e­ uent charge borne by the domestic rm is calculated as follows. The
amount of excess pollution over an above the limit, P , is multiplied by the per unit e­ uent
charge,  . This amount is borne by rms which failed to invest in the wastewater treatment
technology. This suggests that the amount that each of these rms needs to pay does not only
depend on the amount of pollution it discharged but also on the amount of pollution discharged
by all other rms. The larger is the number of rms which do not invest in the wastewater
treatment technology, the more likely that the level of aggregate pollution exceeds the limit,
the more likely that the government needs to levy the e­ uent charge and the larger will be the
e­ uent charge. We suppose that large and small rms do not face the same e­ uent charge. In
particular, the amount of e­ uent charge levied on the large rms is l times larger than that is
levied on the small rms, where l > 1.
At t2, the government observes the realised proportion of rms which had invested in the
wastewater treatment technology and evaluates the amount of e­ uent charge to be levied on
the non-investing rms. Subsequently, rms decide whether or not to shut down production
and leave the market. We suppose that rms will choose to shut down their operation and leave
the market if they make a net negative return.
2.2 Determination of Equilibrium E­ uent Charge Threshold  
We study the coordination game between the large rms in investing in the wastewater treatment
technology. To establish the equilibrium of this coordination game, we follow the Global Game
framework of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). We derive the unique equilibrium threshold, ,
1This information could be available from the monitoring and inspections by the government agency to make
sure that each factory and industrial park meet the industrial e­ uent standards.
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above which the large rms choose to invest in the wastewater treatment technology and below
which the large rms do not invest in the abatement technology2.
Signalling Structure and Threshold Strategy
Conditional on the value of  that would be realised at t2, each rm i receives at t1, a
privately observed signal,  i, which is drawn uniformly from the interval [   ";  + "]. The
signals are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across rms with very small level
of noise, "! 0.
The threshold strategy for each large rm i would be (i) to invest in the wastewater treatment
technology if  i > i and (ii) not invest in the wastewater treatment technology if  i < 

i . The
symmetric threshold strategy would imply that i = 
 for every large rm i.
One of the conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium, , is that an upper dominant
and a lower dominant region must exist. The existence of the upper dominant region ensures
that when a large rm receives a signal indicating a very high penalty, it will choose to invest
in the technology regardless of what the other large rms choose to do. The existence of the
lower dominant region ensures that when a large rm receive a signal indicating extremely low
penalty, it would denitely choose not to invest in the wastewater treatment technology. A
very small probability of an existence of these two dominant regions is su¢ cient (nevertheless
is required) for us to derive a unique equilibrium (see Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for
the proof of this theory). If a large rm receives a signal close to a dominant region, there
is a probability that there would be some large rms which have received signals within that
dominant region and therefore have a dominant strategy. This will ensure that such large rms
also follow that strategy. This process can be iterated so that we eventually arrive at the unique
threshold point, where the large rm will be indi¤erent between investing and not investing in
the wastewater treatment technology.
Derivation of equilibrium threshold, 
In what follows, we derive the unique equilibrium threshold, . The proportion of large
rms that do not invest in the wastewater treatment technology is denoted by ! ( ; ). For
the moment, let large rms choose not to invest in the wastewater treatment technology if they
receive a signal less than ^ . The signal obtained by a large rm i is given by  i. It follows
that the large rm is posterior distribution of the chosen  , which we refer to as z(= = i), is
2Since the small rms do not have any incentive to invest in the wastewater treatment technology in any case
due to their inability to a¤ord, we do not have to derive  for the small rms.
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uniform over [ i   ";  i + "] and is given by,
f(z) =
8<: 12" if z 2 [ i   ";  i + "]0 if z =2 [ i   ";  i + "] (1)
This is true for all except those points very close to the ends of the interval.
For each point z 2 [ i   ";  i + "], the large rm will believe that all other large rms
would have received independently and uniformly distributed signals [z   "; z + "] and hence
the proportion of large rms whom it believes would not invest in the wastewater treatment




0 if z > ^ + "
1 if z < ^   "
^ z+"
2" if ^   "  z  ^ + "
(2)
Consider the range, ^   "  z  ^ + ". Let us work out the critical proportion of rms
that do not invest in the wastewater treatment technology needed to trigger the government to
impose the e­ uent charge. It is required that the aggregate pollution contained in the e­ uent
in the economy exceeds the limit set by the government, P . Then, let ! represent the critical
proportion of large rms which do not invest in the wastewater treatment technology so that
the non-investing rms are faced with the e­ uent charge if and only if ! > !:





(1  ) eL : (4)
It is important to note that ! would exist only if P > eS+ (1  ) eL, which implies that
the limit on pollution should exceed the amount of pollution discharged when all large rms
invest in the wastewater treatment technology. The large rm believes that the government will
levy the e­ uent charge if and only if ~! > !, that is





(1  ) eL ; (5)
which, after rearranging, yields:






(1  ) eL : (6)
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Let _ be the amount of e­ uent charge, above which su¢ cient proportion of large rms invest
in the wastewater treatment technology; thus, no e­ uent charge is levied. It follows from (6)
that:






(1  ) eL : (7)
Conditional on  , in order to determine each large rms expected cost of investing in the
wastewater treatment technology, there are two scenarios to be considered. First, when ! < !,
the proportion of large rms which decide not to invest in the technology is su¢ ciently low so
the government does not levy the e­ uent charge. In this case, those rms which did not invest
in the wastewater treatment technology could get away with the e­ uent charge. In the second
scenario, consider the case in which !  !. In this case, the proportion of large rms which
decide not to invest in the wastewater treatment technology is too high such that the amount
of pollution contained in the water exceeds the allowable limit. This triggers the government
to levy the e­ uent charge on the small and large rms which do not invest in the wastewater
treatment technology, given by
TS =
(eS + (1  ) [eL + ! (z) eL (1  )]  P ) z
l (1  )! (z) + 
and
TL = l
(eS + (1  ) [eL + ! (z) eL (1  )]  P ) z
l (1  )! (z) +  ;
respectively. The expected costs borne by large rm i if it decides to invest or not invest in the
wastewater treatment technology are given in Table 1.

































Table 1: Expected Cost of Investment Decision
From Table 1, it follows that the di¤erence in the expected cost of large rm i, which received
signal  i, between not investing and investing in the wastewater treatment technology is given
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by:




















  P  z




In equilibrium, it requires that  i =  satises g() = 0, whereby the large rm i would be
indi¤erent between investing and not investing in the wastewater treatment technology. Since
all large rms are assumed to be identical, they will choose not to invest in the wastewater
treatment technology if they received a signal below  and will choose to invest if they received




















  P  z
(1  )    z+"2" + l
!
dz = I: (9)
3 Comparative Statics Analysis on  
In this section, we conduct the comparative statics analysis in order to analyse how the equi-
librium threshold, , changes when there is a change in the cost of investment in wastewater
treatment technology, I; the limit on pollution, P , determined by the government; the propor-
tion of small rms, ; the amount of pollution discharged by rms not investing in abatement
technology, eS , eL; the di¤erence in the e­ uent charge between the large and the small rms
captured by l; and the amount of residual pollution despite the presence of wastewater treatment
technology, .
It is important to note that an increase in the equilibrium threshold, , indicates that it
is more di¢ cult to ensure that the large rms invest in the wastewater treatment technology
and the probability of investment is decreasing in . Equation (9) is used in the comparative
statics analysis that follows.
We begin by analysing the impact of a change in the cost of investment in wastewater
treatment technology on the equilibrium threshold, . When I increases, the costs borne by
the rms increase. To o¤set this e¤ect, the expected cost of not investing in the technology
needs to rise, which means  should increase. It follows that @

@I > 0. This result suggests
that an increase in the cost of investment in wastewater treatment technology makes it more
di¢ cult to achieve a coordination among domestic rms.
Next, we analyse the impact of an increase in the limit on pollution, P , on the equilibrium
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threshold, . When P increases, the expected cost of not investing in the wastewater treatment
technology decreases; thus, the government should increase  to reduce this e¤ect so @

@P > 0.
In other words, if the limit on pollution increases, the probability that the large rms invest in
the wastewater treatment technology declines.
When the proportion of small rms, , increases, the rms which will not invest in the
wastewater treatment technology increases since the small rms cannot a¤ord the expensive
investment in such abatement technology in any case. This leads to an increase in the e­ uent
charge that is imposed on the large rms that did not invest in the abatement technology,
causing the expected cost of not investing in the technology to increase. To o¤set this e¤ect,
 has to go down. It follows that @

@ < 0. In sum, the higher is the proportion of small rms
(which do not invest in the wastewater treatment technology anyway), the higher will be the
probability that the pollution limit be exceeded; therefore, it is required that larger proportion
of large rms should invest in the wastewater treatment technology to prevent the penalty from
being too high.
What happens to  if the amount of pollution discharged from the rms that do not invest
in the wastewater treatment technology, eS and eL, increases? When eS (or eL) increase,
the total level of pollution discharged by small rms (or large rms) increases. Both of these
eventualities will raise TL, which is the total e­ uent charge that the government levies on the
large rms that do not invest in the wastewater treatment technology, resulting in an increase
in the expected cost of not investing in the technology. To o¤set such e¤ect,  has to go down,
which implies that @

@ej
< 0, for j = S;L.
In what follows, we consider the impact of an increase in l on . As l increases, TL increases.
To counter this e¤ect, the range over which this payment needs to be made has to decline, i.e.
 has to be lower. As more of the burden from e­ uent charges is transferred to the large rms,
the more the large rms will be encouraged to invest in the abatement technology to reduce the
risk of exceeding the pollution limit and get away with being charged for not investing.
Last but not least, it is important to highlight that one needs to be careful with the com-
parative statics analysis for the impact of changing the level of residual pollution, , on .
When  increases, the level of pollution discharged by rms that invested in the wastewater
treatment technology increases so there is a higher risk that the pollution limit be exceeded
and the expected cost for those rms which did not invest in the abatement technology would
be higher. If the rm does invest in the technology, it will not be punished irrespective of the
level of pollution contained in the river ecosystem. Therefore, when  is higher, the large rms
would invest in the abatement technology at a lower  , which implies that  does not need to
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be high, so @

@ < 0.
Our results from the comparative statics analysis are summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The probability of investing in the wastewater treatment technology decreases
(i.e.  goes up) with the cost of investment in the technology, I, and the pollution limit, P .
The probability of investing in the abatement technology increases (i.e.  goes down) with the
proportion of small rms, , the proportion of the burden passed onto the large rms, l, the
amount of pollution discharged by small and large rms which fail to invest in the technology,
eS and eL, and the residual pollution, .
4 Design of Optimal Policy for E­ uent Charge
The policy question that arises is how should the optimal e­ uent charge,  , be chosen by the
government. It is common knowledge that the small rms do not invest in the wastewater
treatment technology regardless of the signal on  , and that all large rms do not invest in the
abatement technology if  <  but choose to invest if  > . In this paper, we argue that
the objectives of the government are twofold: minimising the amount of pollution in the river
ecosystem and caring about the payo¤s of the domestic rms in the economy (including the
survival of small rms).
For the small rms, if the aggregate amount of pollution in water exceeds the limit, P ,
these rms will incur a cost TS ( ; !). These small rms can bear this cost up to a certain
degree. There exists a particular level of  which will trigger the payo¤s of the small rms to
be negative, forcing them to close down their operations and leave the market. Let us denote
such value of  by  c. Given that the payo¤ for each small rm is given by S   TS , it follows
that  c is dened as the level of  which satises the following equation:
S  
 








  P   c
l (1  )    c+"2" +  = 0: (10)
We can conclude that  c > 0 exists because, when  c = 0, the LHS of equation (10) is
strictly positive, and when  c ! 0, LHS !  1. From equation (10), it follows that (i)
when  < S [l(1 )+]eS+(1 )eL , the small rms will survive even though there is no investment in the
wastewater treatment technology by the large rms (! = 1); (ii) when  > SeS+(1 )eL , small
rms will shut down even if all large rms invest in the wastewater treatment technology (! = 0).
Proposition 2 There exists a level of e­ uent charge,  c, above which the small rms will shut
down their operations and exit the market. The lower are S and l and the higher are , eL and
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eS, the more di¢ cult it would be to enforce large rms to invest in the wastewater treatment
technology.
Given the governments objective of ensuring the survival of small rms which cannot a¤ord
to invest in the wastewater treatment technology, it follows that  cannot exceed  c. All large
rms will invest so long as  >  + ". Therefore,  should be the lower of ( c;  + "). Min-
imising the amount of pollution requires that all large rms invest in the wastewater treatment
technology, and this can be achieved if  c <  + ". In order to ensure the survival of small
rms while increasing the e­ uent charge to encourage large rms to invest in the wastewater
treatment technology,  c should be higher. Small rms will be able to survive higher levels of
 so long as they have more prots (larger S) more e¢ cient wastewater treatment technology
(lower , eL and eS) and more of the burden from e­ uent charge is borne by the large rms if
the pollution exceeds the limit (higher l).
We observe that if the limit on pollution is too strict, the small rms are unable to survive
so they have to shut down their operation. If such limit is su¢ ciently lax, this would result
in an increase in the amount of pollution because the small rms could continue to produce
without using the wastewater treatment technology to deal with the pollution contained in the
e­ uent and the large rms are encouraged not to invest in the abatement technology. If the
government is determined to reduce the water pollution without driving the small rms out of
the market, it should subsidise the small rms for their investment in the wastewater treatment
technology with an amount I  S and set the pollution limit at e so that, unless all domestic
rms invest in the abatement technology, those which do not invest will be penalised.
5 Conclusion
We have considered the problem of coordination failure among rms to invest in wastewater
treatment technology. The government introduces an e­ uent charge to ensure that rms invest
in this technology. The higher the proportion of rms which do not invest, the higher will
be the possibility of being charged, and the higher will be the cost. The model shows that
the more e¢ cient the technology, the sti¤er should be punishment to ensure investment. The
model shows that the probability of investment in the technology by the large rms increases
with the proportion of small rms and the pollution emitted by both small and large rms. The
probability of investment goes down with: the cost of investment; e¢ ciency of the technology;
and the level of water pollution the government will allow. We also consider the fact that small
rms cannot survive if the charge is too high, and the government cares not only about the
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environment but also about the survival of rms. The paper explains why the government
cannot be too strict in implementing environmental policy if there are too many small rms
whose mere survival would be threatened by such strictness.
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